Tactical View for Cyber Security Framework

Collaboration with SPAWAR SoS Engineer (Ret.) / Cyber Security Consultant and Cyber Clarity

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What level of protection is really provided here?



When a capability is "invisible", like IA, safety, reliability, etc, what you see is not the whole picture!

The gates were fully locked, properly configured and validated. I could not get through *them*. But.... Thus Cyber can be an illusion...

Roadmap to Execution

"CSF" value points.

Threat overview / perspective

CSF background / pressure points

Tactical view


Summary

Be wary of a false sense of security Monitor & measure using CSF




Cyber Security – Overall Status

(Senior IA VIP (Mike Jacobs) - same issues as 40-50 years ago, but better in last 10)



We all need to provide an integrated, cyber package that is affordable

Gartner's 2013 Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies



SO... what does matter in Cyber?

CYBER is fundamentally all about TRUST and DATA

(Identity / authentication / secure comms - -- provenance, quality, pedigree, assured)

It's NOT about expensive new cyber capabilities / "toys"

but more **about the interoperability "glue"** (distributed trust, resiliency, automation, profiles)

90+% of security incidents are from <u>lack of doing the basics</u>! HAVE effective Security Continuous Monitoring (SCM / SIEM) – a MUST DO! USE enforced: cyber hygiene, enterprise access control, & reduce complexity (*APLs*) Shift from only protecting the network, to the <u>DATA security itself</u> – information centric view

Embrace your <u>Risk Management Plan</u> (RMP) – *LIVE IT*!

Have an *enforceable security policy* – what is allowed / not – train to it *KNOW your baseline* - Protect the business from the unknown risks as well Employ a <u>due diligence level of security</u> – then **transfer residual risks!**

You can NOT buy cyber, so manage the cyber BASICS well!

An achievable 90-95% solution to MOST vulnerabilities – stabilize the environment!

Yes, It is ALL about the DATA!

2020 Vision

(Courtesy of Dan Green / SPAWAR):

Themes and Memes (Technology vs Technology Adoption)

Convergence = Genomics, Robotics, Informatics, Nanotech (each a \$B+ market) "CBAD" = Cloud, Big Data, Analytics, Data Science (are you 'all-in?") *Telematics* = Sensing robotics, Cyber Physical Systems (will kids need to learn to drive?) *Interactive 3D* = Augmented Reality, HTML 5, Three.js (3D graphics for WebGL) *Embedded Computing* = eHPC, Tessel (mCPU / Java), Programmable hardware LBS = Location Based Services, IPS, Beaconing, NFC **IOT** = Internet of Things, M2M, Quantified Self *Mobilization* = Preparation for Conflict/Competition, Autonomy, The Draft STEM = Science Technology Engineering Math , Generation NOW, Old Dogs (YOU)

In a data-centric world, we need Privacy by Design (PbD)

Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report - DBIR (2014)

A huge sample size! This includes YOUR business category too !!!

10 year series, 63,437 incidents, 1367 breaches, 95 countries

WHAT

- 92% incidents described by just nine patterns
 - from geopolitical attacks to large-scale attacks on payment card system
- Sectors Public (47, 479), Information (1132) and Finance (856)

Threats (%) - POS intrusions - 31

- Web App Attacks 21
- Cyber espionage 15
- Card Skimmers 14
- Insider misuse 8
- Crimeware 4

See also - **Ponemon** Institute's cyber report Key threats – *from cost based activities* Malware, malicious insiders and web-based attacks

Mitigations


- restrict remote access

- enforce password policies
- Minimize "non" POS activity on those terminals
- Deploy A/V (everywhere, POS too)
- evaluate threats to prioritize treatments
- Look for suspicious network activity
- Use two-factor authentication

We have met the cyber enemy, and they are US


Integrated **Business RMP** Approach

+ Especially for Small / Medium Business (SMB) = THE ANSWER +



Common Risk Management Plan (RMP) model AND IAW the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

DoD Cyber S&T Roadmap What matters? Key Capability Gaps / Areas "4+1"



Cyber PSC PA-Releasable Briefing November 2012 Page-10

Gaps are not "things / capabilities" but integration and interoperability!

Overview of Framework

Framework Core

- Core presents industry standards, guidelines, and practices
- Focus on 5 functions (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover)
- Framework Implementation Tiers
 - Provide a way to view cybersecurity risk and to manage the risk
 - Consideration from current risk management practices, threat environment, legal and regulatory environment, mission and organizational constraints
- Framework Profile
 - Organization selecting the Framework Category and Subcategory
 - Looking to improve "As Is" and "To Be"
 - Used to conduct self-assessment and communications within an organization

Framework Roadmap

what's still needed to enhance CSF

Automated Indicator sharing – more effective ways to detect and respond to events

Conformity Assessment - capability meets requirements within CSF

Cybersecurity workforce – adapt, design, develop maintain and improve security practices.

Data Analytics – tools with new computing methods = new processes to analyze all data

Agency alignment – Integrate CSF & RMF to enhance policy, reduce burden with common postures

International alignment – help effective operate globally and manage new risks.

Technical privacy standards – translate FIPPs into methods for effective privacy metrics / risks.

Tools to easily assess and organization's CSF posture, Support analytics / trending, broad use – including privacy

Our Tactical View Focus On:


Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category				
		ID.AM	Asset Management				
		ID.BE	Business Environment				
ID	Identify	ID.GV	Governance				
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment				
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy				
		PR.AC	Access Control				
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training				
PR	Protect	PR.DS	Data Security				
TR.	Trotect	PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures				
		PR.MA	Maintenance				
		PR.PT	Protective Technology				
			Anomalies and Events				
DE	Detect	DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring				
		DE.DP	Detection Processes				
		RS.RP	Response Planning				
	Respond	RS.CO	Communications				
RS		RS.AN	Analysis				
		RS.MI	Mitigation				
		RS.IM	Improvements				
		RC.RP	Recovery Planning				
RC	Recover	RC.IM	Improvements				
		RC.CO	Communications				

Full Security Lifecycle Management

Understand, Validate, Execute, Sustain


- Building a Positive Security Posture for an organization requires a focused approach
- Building a Compliance Automation Reporting (CAR) process is your first step
- Once an organization is reached a **State of Positive Health**, Enhanced Situational Awareness (**ESA**) can be executed
- **Sustainability** of ESA is crucial to a Positive Security Posture
- Integrates easily in a Compliance Risk Scoring Approach
- Meets CyberScope

The BIG PICTURE





POA&M Workflow



Vulnerability Management Process

National		Tools	nerabilities sour	ce			
Next SCB Moder 2015 Overhead With is the to 5 potentiation processing of standards based vulnerably management date. This date analysis accention	SAM Instante Inne Kord Kommin Maren Constant Venatur Constanti National College Average Systems Valienza (SAS) System Average Systems Valienza (SAS) Systems (SAS) Valienza Valienza (SAS) Valienza Valienza	🖈 Manual lo	ad of vulnerabili	ities from sources		,	Fetz
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R148 Child Danks 20136 CPL Instan Last appleted: The Mar- 26 Lines 53 CPT 2013	Explorate/lifty Selbscore: 8.4 CVEE Averain 2. Herrise: Access Verders: Monor explorately: Verter must valuetarily interact with attack rescharitien	NVD - 2007 NVD - 2008	NVD 2007 file NVD 2008 file		http://nvd.nist.gov/download/nvdcve-2007.xml	No	1
CVE Publication rates 13.17	Access Complexity: Redum Authentication: Not required to exploit	NVD - 2008 NVD - Recents		cve-1.2-cvss.php cve-1.2-cvss.php		Yes	ľ
Eval List	Impact Type: Allow: unauthorized modification	NVD - updates	NVD Updates	cve-1.2-cvss.php	http://nvd.nist.gov/download/nvdcve-modified.xml	Yes	7

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Manage FISMA


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Date Last Updated:				IS Турк:			CMB Project ID:			
Component Name:				POC Name:						
System / Project Name:				POC Phone:			Security Costs:			
DoD IT Registration No:				POC E-Mail:						
Weakness (1)	CAT (2)	IA Control and Impact Code (3)	POC (4)	Resources Required (5)	Scheduled Completion Date (6)	Milestones with Completion Dates (7)	Milestone Changes (E)	Source Identifying Weakness (3)	Status (10)	Comment (11)
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Architectural View of ESA with CAR

Compliance Automation Report

Employs GOTS & open source software

- Reduced cost of ownership
- Vendor Agnostic
- Conforms to Federal standards
- Real-time, federated architecture
- Consumes and Produces SCAP (XCCDF)







CAR Dashboard and Application (Advantages of using CAR)

- CAR's Functions
 - Provides a unified dashboard to access and display multi-vendor security compliance and risk applications at the organizational level (lowest level)
 - Inputs FDCC scores in XCCDF format
 - Groups FDCC fail scores into 7 risk categories (0-6, risk category 0 = 100% compliance)
 - Provides a per desktop compliance score (0-100%) vs. risk score (0 7) of the organization on a two-dimensional graph that clearly identifies outliers
 - Transforms XCCDF to an industry standard lightweight data interchange format and compresses it to two orders of magnitude less than original format
 - Distributes the compressed risk and compliance data up the organizational hierarchy via the Federated Framework


Agencies can gain the ability to easily share and distribute compliance and risk information with CAR to provide a global defensive posture of your networks

Integrating this into a large enterprise





Data Model of what you can view




Building a common Taxonomy

- 1) Describe their current cybersecurity posture;
- 2) Describe their target state for cybersecurity;
- 3) Identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement within the context of a continuous and repeatable process;
- 4) Assess progress toward the target state;
- 5) Communicate among internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity risk.

Describe their current cybersecurity posture;


- Setting up agreed baseline metrics
- Example (Outlier Reports)

Outlier Explanation




Old way of viewing a FDDC report

Old Approach




Applying Severity Rating to the FDCC Report

Two inputs – Severity and Metric



Outlier Reports 1 0f 3




Outlier Reports 2 of 3

Create a Framework that inputs Severity & a Metric

- •Idea is to create ways to measure impact universally
- Allows each client to set their OWN impact
 Still aligns with Strategic Data Strategy with some proprietary approach

Create Multiple Outlier reports that help show Impact to the Mission

- •Common Operational Picture
- Intuitive
- •Can be re-purposed



Outlier Reports 3 of 3 Defining Severity & Metric in other areas

Severity -Measuring against known vulnerabilities with a level of impact

- •Cat1, Cat2, Cat 3 Finding
- •Patches
- •Signatures
- •Malwares

Metric – Component that shows average usage for sustainment


- •Time
- Software Version
- •Certain Percentage score

ltem	Severity	Metric			
FDCC	Registry items	FDCC Score (0 – 100)			
Network Operations	Bandwidth Usage	Time of the day			
Configuration Management	Software Vulnerability	Versions			

Aggregate View of FDCC/USCGB Report in our pilot application

LOCATION	PROFI	LE	#	L%	Μ%	Н%
BALTIMORE			29	70%	24%	6%
WASHINGTON DC			48	71%	27%	2%
DENVER			40	73%	17%	10%
ALBUQUERQUE			31	75%	16%	9%
HOUSTON			32	76%	21%	3%
PRINCETON			46	79%	15%	6%
CLEVELAND			23	79%	13%	8%
МІАМІ			42	79%	14%	7%

Outlier Report on one section in our pilot application




Describe their target state for cybersecurity;

 Understanding the targeted area and what level we need to set them is implemented through Threshold Settings.

Threshold Settings 1 of 3

FDCC Report

Two inputs – Severity and Metric



Outliers will help to set up the baseline status of Health and will be used to set up **thresholds**.

Algorithm **Risk Score** = Total Assets/ number of severity



Threshold Settings 2 of 3



Setting up a threshold against the **Highs** will alert us when each location is exceeding the allowable threshold.

Threshold Settings 3 of 3

Location	Asset Over Threshold over 10%	Cat Findings causing the issues
Virginia	192.168.1.23	CVE 204-5098
	192.215.1.23	CVE 34-6098
Michigan	168.2.3.5	CVE 120-7864
	168.4.3.5	CVE 204-5098
New York	172.3.5.78	CVE 204-5098
	172.3.5.78	CVE 120-7864

Being able to identify assets that are outside of the thresholds are on the remediation list as soon as possible. Identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement within the context of a continuous and repeatable process;

 Understanding the basic reporting and adding indicators to help prioritize the content – I.E (FDCC/USCGB graphs)

Continuous Monitoring to help Identify and prioritize

FINANCE SERVICES: FDCC SCORING VS. SEVERITY				
SEVERITY	FDCC SCORING #			
	periode de la companya	etter and and and	40	
	= (1,1,1,2,1,2,1,2,1)	and a state of the	104	
	(1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	lang sa karatan sa	571	
	50% 75	5% 100%		

Outlier



Threshold Settings

Assess progress toward the target state

- Defining baseline metrics through Outlier
 Reports and Threshold Settings can help your organization Assess Progress.
- Once you have set up the basic metrics, your organization can move into Threat Vectoring and Active Threat Management

Assess progress toward the target state (cont)


Data Sources	Algorithm	
Known Alerts	Outlier	Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3
	Threshold Setting	╶╪╪╪╪
Known Behavior Outside Data Source	Threat Vectoring	
Not waiting for trouble, Seek trouble	Active Threat Management	Explore the internet Intelligence

Communicate among internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity risk.


- Building Common Operation Picture (COP) and sharing definitions can help improve communications with stakeholders
- Having an open architecture to help communicate with other disparate data sources
- Implementing SCAP to provide automated reporting to other stakeholders


Open Architecture


Data Flow Chart for a Federated Framework at each Tier 3 level



Data flow through the open architecture








Common Operation Picture for CAR

- A vendor neutral network security capability
- Aggregates and distributes the networks' defensive posture across the organizational hierarchy
- SCAP compliant




After sustaining an organization, move into Active Threat Management (ATM)


- 1. Digital DNA detects zero-day malware on a host
- 2. Agent framework distributes malware signature to CATD
- 3. CATD monitors network for new malware signature, correlates signature, and runs business logic against data
- CATD sends required network changes to block the spread of the malware from infected host to ATM
- 5. The ATM sends TTP the appropriate information to open ticket and alert security/network personnel
- 6. Human then accepts or denies suggested remediation
- 7. TTP communicates back to ATM server with response
- 8. ATM signals DDN to configure network devices to protect network from new malware if applicable
- 9. ATM distributes malware signature to all sites in federation and sends confirmation of applied network change to CATD if applicable
- 10. CATD sends confirmation of change back to ATM server if applicable and updates Black/White list
- 11. ATM sends confirmation of change back to TTP for ticket closure if applicable or apply open issues to RM

Use Case for Active Threat Management





Correlate ATM Findings across the Enterprise



Business & Cyber Security opportunities

(& related System Engineering / Integration efforts)

IT / Cyber Global factors – user pull

World-wide B2B Trust / cloud / sharing IoT / M2M Automation / Sensors Consumerization of IT Phones / wireless / *apps* Privacy / Data IP / PII / compliance

GAPS / Needs

(from the Federal cyber priority council S&T gaps)

TRUST Distributed / MLS Resiliency SW / apps / *APIs* / services Agile operations BE the vanguard / *integration* Effective missions Business success factors

Vulnerabilities / Threats

(Verizon BDR, Forbes, etc threat reports - what ails us most)

CM / Hygiene patching / *settings*

Access control Authentication is key TOP security mitigations Whitelist, patch, limit access

Risk Mgmt Adhoc / not global

Future Opportunities

Effective Business risk management (BRM) = cybersecurity framework (<u>CMMI</u> / RMF / COBIT) Reducing business risk / liabilities... Managed security services (MSS) & cyber insurance ...

SIEM / SCM

QA hygiene / sensors "ESA" / simple tools!

Mobile Security

Poor apps / IOS weak billions users = volume

Mitigate Obsolescence

Minimize patching, legacy vulnerabilities OA / modularity / APIs & SCRM <u>Data Security</u>

Predictive analytics <u>Privacy by design</u>

Summary

- Applying algorithms to help define metrics
- Aggregate the metrics to define Threshold Settings
- Once your baseline metrics have been defined, Threat Vectoring can be achieved
- Moving to proactive posture through Active Threat Management

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